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MEMORANDUM OF TRANSMITTAL

To: Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman; and Senator Alan K.
Simpson, Ranking Minority Member.
From: Members of Subcommittee Study Mission: Jerry M. Tinker,
Staff Director; Michael Myers, Counsel; Richard W. Day, Minority Counsel; and Gregory Craig, Foreign Policy Advisor to
Senator Kennedy.
The attached report reflects our findings and recommendations
based upon a week-long study mission to the field in early April
1988 to assess the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan. During
our stay in Pakistan we conferred with senior officials of the Pakistan Government, with international arid voluntary agencies, and
with the U.S. Ambassador and his senior staff. We visited refugee
villages along the Afghan-Pakistan border in the Peshawar region
and in Quetta, and had extensive conversations with those officials
working directly with refugees both in Pakistan as well as in the
cross-border operation into Afghanistan. We also met with representatives of the Afghan resistance.
In addition to official briefings here in Washington, we returned
through Geneva to consult with U.S. negotiators and the Pakistan
Foreign Minister on the terms of the Geneva accord and the modalities for its implementation.
In light of developments in the field, and particularly in Geneva
with the signing of the accord,, the Afghan refugee situation has
clearly reached a major crossroad, presenting new problems and
some extraordinary new challenges to the international community-in particular to the four signatory parties to the accords and
their associates in the field.
This report is a "snap shot" assessment of current issues and developments in what is admittedly a rapidly changing situation. We
have attempted to report the perspective from the field, as well as
outline some options, contingency plans, and new programs that
will likely be required to deal with the changing Afghan refugee
situation-particularly in anticipation of a major repatriation
effort funded by the international community over the coming
year.
· The following reflects our views and findings. However, we were
assisted by Timothy Lenderking in the preparation of background
research and analysis. Mr. Lenderking served as a subcommittee
intern following work with voluntary agency programs in Pakistan
in 1987, and we greatly appreciate his important contributions to
this report.
(III )

FOREWORD

BY SENATOR EDWARD

M.

KENNEDY, SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

For 9 long years, the world's largest refugee population has lived
with the hope that one day they might be able to return to their
war-ravaged country. Beginning in 1979 when the Soviet Union
sent armies of invasion and occupation into neighboring Afghanistan, 5 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran to escape the invading Soviet troops and the brutal repression that followed.
Today, there is the prospect that these long years of suffering
and conflict may finally be drawing to a close. But many obstacles
and challenges remain to be met and overcome before peace will
return to Afghanistan.
This report outlines the origins of the conflict and describes the
Soviet invasion, the developing refugee crisis and, thanks to a political and diplomatic breakthrough, the prospects for the repatriation of the refugees and a political settlement in Afghanistan. It
also relates the extraordinary suffering the Afghan people have experienced as well as the generous outpouring of international relief
and assistance to help millions of men, women and children in
need.
The international program of humanitarian assistance has allowed millions of Afghans to escape and to live in relative safety,
but the key to the end of this crisis has been the courage and determination of the Afghan freedom fighters who have fought so valiantly to resist Soviet occupation. Against all odds and with limited
outside support, they carried on the struggle. And now, because of
that resistance, the Soviets have been persuaded that their troops
must finally leave Afghanistan to the Afghan people.
That decision came in the context of long and patient negotiations led by United Nations mediator, Diego Cordovez. His persistent intervention, at the direction of the U.N. Secretary General
and in response to repeated resolutions from the General Assembly, set the stage for the signing of the Geneva accords on April 14,
1988. This historic document establishes a framework that will
allow the people of Afghanistan the chance to work for peace and
stability and self-determination. This agreement will not end the
fighting, but it will surely hasten the day when millions of Afghan
refugees will be able to return to their homes and lands.
In addition to the heroism of the Afghans themselves and the patient persistence of U.N . mediator Cordovez, another factor that
contributed to the Soviets' decision was the sustained, bipartisan
support for the policy initiated by President Carter and continued
by President Reagan to provide assistance to the Afghan people
and their efforts to resist Soviet occupation.
(V )

VI

The tasks that remain are great, and good will alone will not be
enough. Serious political and humanitarian issues must still be resolved, requiring continued determination and generosity. Without
that, there is little chance that the refugees will be able to return,
or that a genuine peace will replace years of conflict in the countryside.
At this crucial stage, we and others involved in the peace process
must be vigilant against those who would undermine the Geneva
accords or otherwise continue the conflict. In particular, the
United States must-continue to provide support to the international agencies
involved in the refugee effort;
-support scrupulous implementation and verification of the
Geneva accords;
-use whatever leverage the United States has at its disposal
to support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to establish an interim government in Afghanistan; and
-within the context of the accords, maintain existing levels
of assistance for the Afghan people who seek to return to their
country and rebuild their nation.
If these four challenges can be met, even minimally, then peace
and some stability may again return to Afghanistan and the long
suffering of its people will come to an end.
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I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

POLICY ISSUES

(a) The aims of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan should be the following:
-The withdrawal of all Soviet troops and advisers from all
of Afghanistan and the elimination of the Soviet military
threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf;
-A political resolution of the differences between the various Afghani factions-including the PDPA-that will end the
fighting and produce a stable, independent, legitimate national
government in Kabul; and
-The return of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan to
Afghanistan.
(b) To achieve these objectives, the United States should:
-Support implementation and verification of the accords;
-Support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to establish an interim government in Afghanistan;
-Continue to support those international agencies, such as
the UNHCR and the ICRC, that will be involved with the repatriation of the Afghan refugees; and
- In this connection, the United States should resist all
temptations to recognize a provisional government in the
weeks ahead, for it would be a sure-fire formula for a protracted civil war. We must allow the U.N. peace process to work,
and to take no action that could be perceived as undermining
the Geneva accords.
(c) U.S. policy should retain sufficient flexibility to accommodate
any of the possible outcomes in Afghanistan.-The U.S. should support continued funding of U.S. programs for the Afghans at existing levels, while understanding that whatever influence and leverage the United States can exercise with the Afghans is, at best, extremely limited. For that reason, the United States should take
care that it not become identified with one Afghan faction over the
others.
(d) The way in which the United States distributes its assistance
to the Afghans in the future-which Afghans receive it and from
whom-is a problem that deserves serious attention.-It may well
be wise, at this point, to multi-lateralize our cross-border AID operation so that other nations-e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Chinaare also involved in this effort.

2. REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
(a) The Afghan refugee program in Pakistan is a model for programs in other parts of the world.-The government of Pakistan
has ably shouldered the burden of hosting 3 million refugees, and
(1)

-
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has been generously assisted by governments, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and voluntary agencies:
(b) The repatriation of refugees from Pakistan is unlikely to be
sudden, and probably will not begin in large numbers until this
autumn or the spring of 1989.-Most refugees and relief workers
interviewed suggest that refugees will await the departure of
Soviet forces-and possibly even the collapse of the current Kabul
regime-before returning to Afghanistan.
(c) The relief organizations currently working in Pakistan, or in
the cross-border operation, are competently staffed and well attuned
to the needs of the refugees.-These organizations' programs can
easily be transformed from relief to repatriation. However, the obstacles to the establishment of a repatriation resettlement and rehabilitation infrastructure within Afghanistan are extraordinarily
serious.
(d) Afghan refugees will likely return based upon a realistic assessment of their prospects of survival, and many families will be
able to reintegrate successfully on their own without massive assistance. -Many refugee families have frequently returned to Afghanistan as Mujahidin, and have visited their home villages. As a
result, many know the extent of damage to their property, and the
effort that will be required to recultivate their fields and regain
their livelihoods.
(e) The international community should rely heavily upon the expertise already developed in Pakistan to both plan and execute the
repatriation program.-Refugee officers of the Pakistan government and U.N. agencies, as well as voluntary agencies involved
with the current humanitarian cross_-border operation, already
have an impressive knowledge of such vital factors as:
-migration routes into Afghanistan;
-the places of origin within the country from which the refugees have migrated;
-where distribution centers could most productively be located within the country; and
-the extent of medical services available internally and the
means to maintain them, and much more.
(f) The international community must be prepared to function
within Afghanistan to the maximum degree possible, even in the absence of clear governmental authority within the country.-Under
such circumstances, it will be necessary for the international community to provide strong support to agencies which are expert in
relief operations under sensitive political circumstances-primarily
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
(g) The United States should support the decision by the United
Nations Secretary General to appoint as U.N coordinator such a
distinguished person as Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. He has stature in both international diplomacy and relief operations to coordinate international assistance both in and outside of Afghanistan.Because the repatriation program has been made possible through
the United Nations negotiations and sanctioned by the Geneva accords, it was entirely appropriate for the Secretary General to
maintain, through his representative, a leading role.
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Given the complexity and size of the repatriation program, and
the humanitarian needs within Afghanistan-as well as the
number of U.N., international, voluntary agencies, and bilateral
programs that are likely to be involved-international coordination
will certainly be required. In this context, however, there should be
no question that the lead agency for the repatriation program
should be the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
who has the experience and ability as well as the presence in the
field.

II. POLICY ISSUES: WILL THERE BE PEACE IN
AFGHANISTAN?
The study mission's trip occurred in the midst of rumors that the
Geneva accords were in the final stages of negotiation. In fact,
what initially prompted the decision to make the trip was General
Secretary Gorbachev's announcement on February 8, 1988 that the
Soviet Union planned to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by
the end of the year. If the Soviets were to follow through on Gorbachev's announcement, the situation inside Afghanistan could
change so dramatically and so rapidly that the Afghan refugee population might embark on a sudden mass migratory return to Afghanistan, thereby creating a serious challenge for the various
international and private voluntary organizations involved in the
refugee effort. Such a decision taken spontaneously and simultaneously by 5 million Afghan refugees-2 million in Iran and 3 million in Pakistan-to return to their war-torn home country would
pose a repatriation problem of historic proportions.

(4)
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It turned out that there was more than mere rumor behind the
report that the talks were nearing completion. While the delegation was in Pakistan, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze traveled to Tashkent
to meet with General Najibullah, the leader of the Soviet-backed
regime in Kabul. And the day that the delegation arrived in
Geneva to meet with representatives of the UNHCR and the ICRC
(Thursday, April 7, 1988), U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez announced
that an agreement had been reached and would be soon be signed.
In fact, the accords were signed in Geneva one week later (Thursday, April 14, 1988).
,
The primary purpose of the trip was to look at the refugee programs inside Pakistan and to examine plans for repatriation of the
Afghan refugee population. But given the political atmosphere at
the time, every conversation included extensive discussion about
the impending accords, their impact on the situation in Afghanistan, and what the likely political and military scenarios for Afghanistan might be-if and when, and after the Soviet army withdrew from its 9-year occupation of that country.
This section of the Report will present some of the views that the
stud~ mission encountered on non-refugee matters.
A.

THE GENEVA ACCORDS

The details of the accords were unknown at the time of our conversations in Pakistan, and the way in which "symmetry" between
the Americans and the Soviets would be achieved was similarly unknown. Nonetheless, there was a general understanding that the
accords involved a commitment by the Soviet Union to withdraw
its troops from Afghanistan within 9 months after implementation
of the accords, and that Pakistan would, in return, pledge to refrain from any activities that "interfered" in internal Afghan affairs, i.e., Pakistan would agree to terminate the use of Pakistani
territory as a sanctuary for the Mujahidin.
(1) THE MUJAHIDIN

The spokesman for the alliance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, expressed intense opposition to the accords. Hekmatyar's views were
as follows:
First, Geneva is meaningless without the participation or approval of the Mujahidin. With or without the accords, the war will go
on. The people are prepared to continue their sacrifice. There is no
sign of fatigue. Time is on the side of the Mujahidin. They are
better organized and better armed than ever before, and their
morale is at an all-time high. The only way that a real peace can
be achieved is for the real parties to the conflict-the Soviet Union
and the Mujahidin-to engage in negotiations. The Mujahidin have
offered to talk with the Soviets about (a) the pace and mode of
their withdrawal, and (b) allowing their departure to occur without
violence. But the Soviets decline to engage in any such negotiations.
Second, the Geneva process and the accords themselves benefit
the Soviets. The Soviets came uninvited and without conditions.
Why should they be able to extract concessions from the United
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States and Pak.i stan as a "price" for their departure? The Soviets
have suffered an unprecedented military defeat, and Geneva
simply pulls the rug out from under those who have won the victory. Geneva was designed to serve Soviet interests, and only when
the accords were ready to be signed did the Americans and the
Pakistanis realize exactly how the agreement helped the Soviets.
The accords legitimize the Najibullah government and strengthen
the Soviets' argument that outsiders are interfering in the internal
affairs of Afghanistan. Evidence of the Soviets' real intentions can
be found in their resistance to the Pakistani proposal for an interim government and in their unhappiness at the American objections to continued Soviet military aid to Najibullah. The Soviets are
trying to achieve at the negotiating table what they could not
achieve with "murderous force" on the battlefield-that is, the survival of the N ajibullah regime. That is the Soviet purpose in
Geneva-to guarantee Najibullah's future in exchange for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Third, the accords are "flawed" because they are premised on
the notion that the war is about the Soviet military presence. That
is only partly true. The war is also about the presence of a Communist government in Kabul. The war will not end until Najibullah is
out and a non-Communist government is in Kabul.
Fourth, the Pakistani government has no business in these negotiations. The Pakistanis have no authority to negotiate for the
Afghan people. In fact, the Pakistanis have a right only to be concerned about the refugees. By participating in the talks, the Pakistanis have allowed the Soviets to create a rift between the Mujahidin and Pakistan, an important Soviet objective.
Fifth, the accords place Pakistan in an untenable position. In exchange for the Soviet pledge to withdraw, Pakistan will pledge that
its territory will not be used in the future by the Mujahidin. Pakistan must either comply, in which case the Mujahidin will have to.
leave Pakistan, or Pakistan will have to violate the accords. If
Pakistan signs this agreement with an intention to violate it, Pakistan shouldn't sign at all.
(2) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

In meetings with U.S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel in Islamabad,
Consul General Michael Malinowski in Peshawar and Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Peck in Geneva, these administration
spokesmen stated their support for the accords, so long as the accords recognized the princple of "symmetry" with respect to Soviet
military assistance to Najibullah and U.S. support for the Mujahidin.
First, this agreement is historic in that it marks the first time
since the Soviet withdrew from Austria in 1955 that the Soviet
Union has agreed to withdraw its military forces from territory
that it has occupied. In light of Gorbachev's new policies, historians
might look back at this agreement and conclude that it represented
a turning point in Soviet foreign policy-a decision to retrench and
consolidate, to rebuild and modernize the Soviet economy rather
than to continue to pursue adventurist, expansionist ambitions.
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Second, in the absence of an agreement involving a formal commitment by the Soviets to leave Afghanistan which includes specific deadlines for their departure, the Soviets have no formal obligation to withdraw all their forces from Afghanistan or to return to
the pre-invasion borders. There is at least some danger that the Soviets may try to create a redoubt in the North, a buffer zone inside
Afghanistan which would result in a de facto partition of Afghanistan. The existence of the agreement adds to the pressure on the
Soviets to get all the way out of Afghanistan. It is true that the
Mujahidin forces are militarily much stronger than they used to
be, but they have not yet taken any Soviet garrisons, and it is inaccurate to say that the Soviets have been defeated militarily. The
Soviets have decided only that they are unwilling to continue to
pay the price of remaining in Afghanistan. A great power like the
Soviet Union has the ability to carry on with a flawed policy-as
the United States did in Southeast Asia-if it is willing to pay the
price. This agreement simply codifies the Soviet's decision to leave
entirely, rather than deploying to new positions within Afghanistan that are more tenable politically and militarily.
Third, if the Mujahidin are so confident of their ability to overwhelm the Najibullah regime after the Soviets depart, then the key
to getting rid of Najibullah is, in fact, getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Most Western analysts agree with the Mujahidin that
no amount of Soviet aid will enable the Najibullah government to
survive for more than a brief time. After all, the rate of desertions
in the Afghan army has been so high, it is notorious throughout
the world as the only army where more troops have fled than
fought. The Mujahidin's second objective-a non-Communist government in Kabul-is not sacrificed in order to achieve the first objective-the Soviets' departure. On the contrary, they are inextricably linked, one leads to the other. The Soviets' withdrawal will
make it possible for a government to emerge in Kabul that reflects
the will of the Afghan people.
Fourth, so long as the accords recognize the principle of symmetry, the Mujahidin will not be disadvantaged-Le., they will continue to receive U.S. military assistance if Najibullah continues to receive Soviet assistance.
Fifth, although no one believes that the mere departure of the
Soviet troops will end the fighting, it will substantially diminish
the scale and intensity of the violence. With the Soviets gone and
with military assistance terminated, the conflict may well continue
but at reduced levels of destruction.
Sixth, the primary U.S. objective in Afghanistan has been to
secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces, to reduce the threat to
Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, and to impose a cost on Moscow for
engaging in such adventurist policies. It is of less interest to the
United States who or what faction is in power in Kabul so long as
the government of Afghanistan is, in fact, a genuine national government and not just a Soviet puppet.
Finally, the success of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is, in large
measures, attributable to the sustained, bipartisan support for that
policy in Congress. Our ultimate success in ending the Soviet occupation and restoring Afghanistan to the Afghan people will also
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depend upon maintaining and continuing that kind of broad and
strong support for U.S. policy in the future.
(3) THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

During an interview in Geneva, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zain Noorani, added the following observations:
First, rather than legitimating Najibullah, the accords place the
Mujahidin on an equal footing with the Communist government in
Kabul. The accords recognize Najibullah's party-the PDPA-as
just another faction inside Afghanistan, not as a government. The
Mujahidin can no longer be treated as "terrorists and bandits" as
the Soviets have called them.
Second, the accords place restraints on future Soviet action in
two ways: if the Soviets do not withdraw from Afghanistan, they
will have violated their commitment as set forth in the accords
and, more importantly, the war will go on as before. If the Soviets
continue to arm Najibullah, the Americans have the right to continue to arm the Mujahidin, thereby providing an incentive to the
Soviets to stop arming Najibullah. In short, the accords set up a
regime that promotes Soviet restraint in the future.
B.

SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

Under the accords, the Soviet withdrawal must commence on
May 15, 1988. The withdrawal must be completed within 9
months-by February 15, 1989-and half of the Soviet troops must
be out within the first 3 months-by August 15, 1988.
Assuming that the Soviet troops are withdrawn in accordance
with that schedule, various views were expressed on the following
issues:
·
Issue No. 1.-Whether the Mujahidin commanders will pursue
the Soviet troops as they withdraw, attacking the weakened Soviet
positions as they leave, inflicting greater loss of life as an exercise
in retribution and vengeance for the brutality of the Soviet occupation. There is an historic precedent for this kind of tactic in the
19th century when the Afghans savagely attacked and decimated a
departing British army.
There were two responses to this question: Yes, the withdrawing
Soviets would be attacked, said the spokesman for the Alliance
(Hegmatyar). The Soviets had been given the opportunity to negotiate their safe departure but had rejected it. And No, the people
were tired of the bloodshed and would let the Soviet troops leave in
peace, said one of the commanders we met in a refugee camp.
In fact, there is reason to believe that there will be no coordinated policy by the Mujahidin. It is most likely that individual commanders will treat the departing Soviet troops not according to
some national policy but as each individual command~r sees fit.
Issue No. 2.-Whether the Mujahidin will continue the war if the
Soviets do not withdraw beyond the pre-invasion borders.
There was unanimity on this issue in principle. All Afghans said
that the Soviets must withdraw all the way, or the war will continue. Western observers-mostly journalists-expressed reservations.
They raised some doubt about whether the Mujahidin who live in
the South will in fact be sufficiently committed to regaining terri-
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tory in the North actually to carry the war beyond their own villages and valleys. These observers say that, after Kabul falls, the
Mujahidin will not behave as a national army but will revert to
bands of warriors loyal to regional and local leaders. See Scenario
No. 3 below.
C.

POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN

Other issues of interest and concern to the delegation included
various possible scenarios that might develop after the Soviets
withdraw. Four scenarios seem possible:
Scenario No. 1-The stalematel partition.-If the Soviets leave
and Najibullah holds on, if Najibullah's party maintains control
over Kabul and the northern provinces-or if there is only a partial Soviet withdrawal-the result might be a de facto partition of
Afghanistan with Najibullah's forces, supported by the Soviets,
unable to occupy all of Afghanistan and unable to dislodge or
defeat the Mujahidin, and the Mujahidin, supported and supplied
by the West and governing through a provisional government, but
unable to defeat or remove Najibullah. This is the most pessimistic
scenario. With two competing governments locked in combat for
control of the country, it is the formula for a protracted and bloody
civil war.
Scenario No. 2-An interim government.-If the various competing factions-including Najibullah's PDPA-are able to agree to an
interim government, there could be an early peaceful resolution of
the conflict. The interim government would operate from Kabul
until nation-wide elections are held. This scenario, by far the most
optimistic, might produce a peaceful and stable transition.
Scenario No. 3.-Civil war without Najibullah.-If the Soviets
withdraw, if Najibullah cannot hold on, and if efforts to forge an
interim government are unsuccessful, there could be continued turmoil between and among the factions within the Mujahidin-an
Afghan civil war without Najibullah.
Scenario No. 4-Najibullah makes peace.-Many close observers
of the Afghan political leadership believe that Najibullah is by far
the shrewdest and most sophisticated political leader involved in
Afghanistan today. He is said to be "a real survivor." It is conceivable that Najibullah will try to split the Mujahidin by reaching out
and negotiating a separate peace with various elements within the
Mujahidin in an effort to isolate the fundamentalists. A Najibullah-led coalition government could succeed if the Mujahidin revert
to their old-time rivalries.
The likelihood of each of these scenarios depends upon the following factors:
-How long and whether the Najibullah regime will be able
to hold out after the last Soviet soldier leaves Afghanistan. At
least one expert believes that the Mujahidin and U.S. intelligence seriously under-estimate the ability of Najibullah's
party, the PDPA, to hold on. He sees Najibullah as being tough
and competent, and the Afghan army as being able, with continued Soviet support, to maintain control over some areas of_
Afghanistan. In his view, the notion that, after the Soviets
depart, the Mujahidin will be able to walk into Kabul and take

11

. over the government is "wildly unrealistic." Others suggest
that Najibullah's government "will fall like a house-of-cards."
-Whether U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez will be successful
in his efforts to negotiate the establishment of an interim government that can effectively rule Afghanistan until nationwide elections can be held. Will the Mujahidin be willing to
participate in a government that includes members of Najibullah's party? Will Najibullah insist that he be a member of the
interim government?
-Whether the Mujahidin will continue to work together
after the Soviets depart or whether, once the common enemy
has disappeared, the coalition will fall apart and the various
factions within the Mujahidin will begin fighting with one another. And, even more likely, if Najibullah also departs, whether the Mujahidin will squabble among themselves about which
faction should be dominant in Kabul?
-Whether the Mujahidin commanders have any political
loyalties, whether they really care about who is in Kabul, or
whether their primary concern is to be left alone by whatever
government is established in Kabul?
-Whether the leaders of the alliance have the support of
the Afghan people or whether the alliance will cease to exist
as a relevant political force inside Afghanistan once the Soviets leave and the alliance leaders return;
-Whether the people of Afghanistan are in fact prepared to
accept a fundamentalist government. What is the level of support for the fundamentalist parties among the Afghan people?
What is the likelihood of a fundamentalist government taking
power in Kabul, and what impact would that have in the
region~particularly with respect to the Muslim population in
the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union?
-Whether the Afghan fundamentalists are like Khomeini or
whether, because they are Sunni as opposed to Shia, the
Afghan brand of fundamentalism is different from the Iranian.
D. U.S.

POLICY

The study m1ss10n believes one reason for the success of U.S.
policy in the region has been the sustained, or bipartisan support
for that policy in Congress throughout two administrations, one
Democratic, one Republican. The study mission believes that continued bipartisan support for U.S. policy is crucial, and to achieve
that support, recommends that the primary aims of U.S. policy in
the region should be the following:
-(1) The withdrawal of all Soviet troops and advisers from
all of Afghanistan and the elimination of the Soviet military
threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf;
-(2) A political resolution of the differences between the
various Afghanistan factions-including the PDPA-that will
end the fighting and produce a stable, independent, legitimate
national government in Kabul; and
-(3) A return of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan
to Afghanistan.
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The study mission believes that, to achieve these objectives, the
United States should (a) support implementation and verification
of the accords; (b) support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to establish an interim government in Afghanistan; (c) resist
the temptation to recognize a provisional government-a sure-fire
formula for a protracted civil war; and (d) continue to support
those international agencies, such as the UNHCR and the ICRC,
that will be involved with the repatriation of the Afghan refugees.
The study mission believes that there are so many uncertainties
and variables in the Afghan situation that U.S. policy should
retain sufficient flexibility to accommodate any of the four scenarios outlined above. For that reason, the study mission supports continued funding of U.S. programs for the Afghans at existing levels.
The study mission has one word of caution with respect to the
cross-border AID program now in progress. The United States
should take care not to make the same mistake that has haunted
the Soviet Union f~>r 9 years. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an
outside power to determine winners and losers inside Afghanistan.
Only the Afghan people are able to do that.
The Soviet Union, even from the vantage point of a bordering
nation and even with the use of 115,000 troops, could not impose its
political will upon the people of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the
United States should recognize its limited ability to affect the situation inside Afghanistan and should understand that whatever influence and leverage the United States can exercise with the Afghans is, at best, attenuated. For that reason, the United States
should take care that it not become identified with one Afghan faction over any of the others. The United States has no capacity to
determine who will govern in Kabul, and we should take pains to
avoid being embroiled in the inevitable competition that will arise
among the Afghans as the Soviets depart.
For that reason, the way in which the United States distributes
its assistance to the Afghans in the future-which Afghans receive
the aid, how and from whom-is a problem that deserves serious
attention. It may well be wise, at this point, to multi-lateralize our
cross-border AID operation so that other nations-e.g., Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, China-are also involved in this effort.

III. HUMANITARIAN ISSUES: REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AND
REPATRIATION
The refugee program for Afghan refugees in Pakistan is both a
unique as well as a model example of how the United Nations Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees would hope countries of first asylum would treat arriving refugees-and Pakistan is
not even a signatory to the Convention or Protocol. For that the
government of Pakistan deserves great credit in hosting a growing
tide of refugees from Afghanistan for the past 10 years.
It is "unique" in the sense that most of the Afghan refugees arriving in the northwest frontier provinces of Pakistan are ethnically and tribally related. There has also been an historic movement
of these people across what, to them, has been an internationally
imposed (indeed, colonial British) boundary. Thus welcoming the
arrival of ethnically related villagers was considered the only hospitable thing to do. As Mr. Ahmed Zeb Khan, an officer with the
Northwest Frontier Province Commission for Afghan refugees said
during an interview, this ethnic similarity means the refugees
"know how to behave as guests, and we know our duties as host."
But, as related later in this report, this initial and generous welcome-while it has lasted for many years-has begun to fray.
It has been "a model" in the sense that the relief and assistance
programs established by the government of Pakistan, with the support and coordination of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
has been extraordinarily successful by any international standard.
The coordination between governments, the United Nations, and
the voluntary agencies has been, by all accounts, extremely effective. Obviously, there have been many problems-as related in this
report-but by-and-large, most observers of international refugee
programs rate the Afghan program in Pakistan as one of the more
generous (on the part of the county of first asylum) and more successful in terms of international support (through the UNHCR).
For the past many years, the focus of the international program
of humanitarian assistance has necessarily been on the care and
maintenance of a growing refugee population-from a few thousand before 1980 to an estimated 3 million this year. During this
period, refugee "camps" (with temporary tents and relief facilities)
have been transformed into refugee "villages" that can be hardly
distinguished from local Pakistani villages in many areas.
The focus today, however, is how these refugees and their temporary villages will be able to return to their native land. The
Geneva accords, and the prospects they hold for a repatriation of
·Afghan refugees, could represent one of the largest repatriation
movements in recent history. In 1972, following the India-Bangladesh crisis, approximately 7 to 9 million Bengalis returned from
India to their villages in Bangladesh-numerically one of the largest repatriations in modern history. But, as a percentage of popula(13)
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tion, it represented only 12 percent of East Bengal's population.
Today, in Afghanistan, the return of 3 million refugees from Pakistan, 2 million from Iran, and the assistance of an estimated 1 million (and possibly more than 2 million) internally dislocated Afghans, will involve nearly 45 percent of Afghanistan's total estimated population. In per capita terms, the Afghan repatriation
could be one of the world's largest . .
However, the repatriation of refugees from Pakistan is not likely
to be sudden. For the very reason refugees flee their homelandsconflict, violence and political strife-they are not likely to return
until those conditions are resolved. In Afghanistan that may be
some period of time.
Most observers believe some spontaneous movement of a small
number of refugees could begin in southern Afghanistan after the
Soviet troops begin their withdrawal. However, most believe no
large-scale, organized movement can begin until early next yearperhaps beginning in the autumn, but mostly in the early months
of 1989. The planting season, among many other factors, will clearly help determine their movement.
As in all refugee repatriations, refugees will likely return based
upon their own-or their community's-realistic assessment of
their prospects of survival, and many families will be able to reintegrate successfully on their own without massive assistance. Hopefully, this prospect will offset expected gaps in assistance within
Afghanistan.
Adult males within the refugee families have already frequently ·
returned to Afghanistan as Mujahidin, and have visited their home
villages. As a result, most refugees know the extent of damage to
their property, and the effort that will be required to recultivate
their fields and regain their livelihoods.
A.

REPATRIATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The structure already exists in Pakistan to facilitate an orderly
repatriation of Afghan refugees. The current relief program of the
UNHCR and Pakistani government-as well as the U.S. AID crossborder operation-have all the essential components needed to support a large-scale repatriation effort. The transition will be complex and problematic, but possible. Given the time now available
for proper planning as well as budgeting, the international community can prepare for such a large-scale program.
But while there is every possibility of the orderly movement of
refugees from Pakistan, the international community must be prepared to face far greater difficulties in assisting their rehabilitation
and resettlement in the war-torn countryside of Afghanistan. Basic
rehabilitation assistance within Afghanistan-such as the provision
of transitional food supplies, seeds and farm implements, medicines, public health and logistical support-is essential to create
the conditions that will make it both possible and desirable for the
refugees to return. Yet, providing these basic needs in Afghanistan
will clearly be the greatest challenge facing the repatriation effort.
Therefore the United Nations and the international community
must be prepared to function within Afghanistan to the maximum
degree possible, even in the absence of clear governmental author-
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ity. Refugees may be returning to Afghanistan before the political
and military situation is fully settled. It is even possible that the
current government in Kabul may not support the international
community's efforts to assist the return of the refugees in areas
they do not control, especially since most oppose the Najibullah
government. Even more likely is the prospect that some of the
Afghan resistance parties will try to stop refugees from returning
or hinder the efforts of organizations working on repatriation until
a political solution satisfactory to their faction is achieved.
Under such circumstances, it will be necessary for the international community to provide strong support to agencies which are
expert in relief operations under sensitive political circumstancesprimarily the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In
addition, the work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
must be guided by pragmatism, rather than by Afghan politics, in
determining its operation within Afghanistan-such as was necessary for U.N. organizations which faced the Kampuchean famine.
1. THE COSTS OF REPATRIATION

In meetings in Pakistan, there were a wide variety of views as to
the projected costs of the Afghan repatriation program. Refugee
program officials outside Pakistan (in the United States and
Europe) tended toward higher estimates, with costs as high as $1.5
billion. But those working with the refugees in Pakistan-as well
as personnel engaged in cross-border humanitarian assistance in
Afghanistan-tended toward much lower estimates. In fact, certain
Pakistan government officials believed the price of repatriation to
be as low as $46 million, assuming also that the international community would for a period continue its food assistance to the
Afghan refugees at current levels.
In the meantime, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and
the World Food Program has developed a provisional plan for reptriation from Pakistan which contains more reliable estimates.
This plan currently is being circulated among likely donor governments for comment, and may later be developed into an official
U.N. appeal to governments for assistance.
The provisional U.N. plan recognizes the difficulty of projecting
the number of refugees who will participate in an international repatriation effort, as opposed to simply returning spontaneously. It
provides a scale of possible costs as follows:
For 1 million refugees........ ............................................ ... ...................
For 2 million refugees ...... ..... ... ....... ....... ....... ..... ............ ....... ... ... ..... ....
For 3 million refugees ...... ...................... ... .............. .... ... ..... ........... .. .. ..

$130 million
226 million
324 million

These costs include the purchase of basic equipment required for
repatriation; transport and other logistics over 1 year; and 6
months of food assistance to each returnee.
It is the sense of Pakistan government officials, voluntary agency
staff, and others in the field that as many as one-third of the refugees will return independently, with some estimating that as many
as two-thirds will return on their own. While it is proper, for planning purposes, to anticipate the return of all 3 million refugees in
Pakistan, it is probably more likely that only about 2 million will
actually participate in the U.N. program.
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However, the uncertainties of this repatriation--:-the fact that
there are no facts about when and how this refugee population will
return-require the continuation of international commitment to
the relief program in Pakistan for the foreseeable future. While
the likelihood is that the refugees will begin returning in large
numbers next spring, or as early as this fall, the volatile political
situation in Afghanistan may preclude their return until much
later. In either case, the assistance programs in Pakistan must continue.
Planning is also proceeding for longer-term development within
Afghanistan. One estimate of the cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Afghanistan over a 4-year period, prepared for the
U.N. Development Program, was $1.3 billion. If the cost of the repatriation movement is added, UNDP estimated the figure to be
over $1.5 billion.
2. THE GENEVA ACCORDS, REPATRIATION, AND THE U.N. ROLE

The accords signed in Geneva on April 14 were in four parts, one
of which addressed specifically the question of refugee repatriation.
The refugee instrument is intended to guarantee that well-established international principles governing repatriation shall apply
in this case. This includes, for example, the right to voluntary repatriation, the righty to freely exercise one's religion upon return,
and other protections. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is
called upon to exercise his conventional role of ensuring that the
repatriation proceeds properly, with full international protections
for the returnees.
Obviously, any repatriation program is complex, but the Afghan
return is complicated by almost a decade of warfare and destruction in Afghanistan, the fragility of Afghan politics over the
coming period, and the desperate needs which will exist within the
country not only to resettlement returnees, but to restore some of
the country's war-damaged infrastructure.
These challenges call for the full array of international programs, and the U.N. Secretary General has taken the proper step
in appointing Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as an overall coordinator who can make clear soon which agencies and which individuals
are to fulfill what roles.
Certain roles are already clear. Mr: Diego Cordovez, the U.N. official who negotiated the Geneva accords, will now devote his capacities to monitoring its implementation. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has a specific mandate under international law
to facilitate repatriation. As such, UNHCR should be the lead
agency for repatriation. The World Food Program has assured food
delivery for the refugees for several years now, and should continue to help in the repatriation as well, in cooperation with UNHCR.
And beyond repatriation will be the longer-term development
needs of Afghanistan.
To date, the politics of Afghanistan and the mechanisms of refugee assistance have been to proceed independently. However, with
repatriation, they become critically important pieces of a single
mosaic, and the international community must support Prince Sadruddin as he assumes the overall coordination which will be re-
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quired within the United Nations and on behalf of the international community.
3 . FACTORS INVOLVED IN REPATRIATION

Any repatriation program must take into account several of the
unique characteristics of the Afghan refugee scene. Many of these
traits will facilitate the return of the refugees; others pose major
impediments.
A distinct advantage, for repatriation purposes, is that the vast
majority of the refugees come from areas in Afghanistan which are
proximate to Pakistan. One survey by Pakistani officials revealed
that as many as 80 percent of the refugees are from within 250 kilometers of the border. This narrows the logistical burden of repatriation considerably. In fact, it is likely that many refugees will be
able simply to walk home.
The same Pakistan government survey found that 90 percent of
the refugees have rural, agrarian origins. This should limit the requirements of repatriation. The vast majority of the refugees will
return to retill the lands their families have farmed for generations. They will not be in the cities, requiring jobs, apartments, and
other support. Most can survive with initial food and the agricultural supplies to recultivate their farms.
The protracted exile of the refugees has enabled the development
of an impressive cast of individuals and organizations engaged both
in the assistance of refugees and in humanitarian assistance programs across the border in Afghanistan. This network of voluntary
agencies, Pakistani officials, U.S. personnel, and others will certainly prove invaluable in the repatriation effort.
In particular, the various cross border humanitarian programs
are an indispensable source of information on conditions in areas
to which the refugees will return. Some voluntary agencies, such as
those working in AID's humanitarian cross-border operation and
the Swedish Development Committee, have already conducted surveys of agricultural conditions in Afghanistan, the availability of
medical services, and more. These agencies and their information
should be used heavily in the repatriation.
In addition, Pakistan possesses a logistical infrastructure capable
of sustaining a major repatriation operation. The massive food requirements of the 3 million refugees have been met using only one
of Pakistan's seaports, Qasixp., without resort to others which could
be used if expanded docking facilities are required. And a fairly impressive array of commercial trucks has transported supplies to refugee settlements throughout the country. U.S. experts calculate
that there is a great capacity for this system to expand quickly if
necessary.
Finally, the refugees themselves, while generally cautious, are
nonetheless anxious to return home. The study mission found little
basis to the claim that large numbers of Afghans will choose residence in Pakistan over a return to Afghanistan. In fact, most refugee relief officials found it preposterous, knowing the refugees, that
there is any reason to believe that anything more than a very
small minority of Afghans will remain in Pakistan. Their over-
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whelming desire to go home should be a boost to efforts to reintegrate them into their homeland.
But there are numerous challenges to repatriation as well. A
steady refrain was the danger to repatriation of a vast array of
land mines and other unexploded ordnance present throughout Afghanistan, reportedly in large amounts. The number of civilian casualties of the war is already too high to be compounded by casualties of the peace. Even now, the International Committee of the
Red Cross is serving an alarming number of patients-many of
them children-who have lost limbs due to land mines. And with
an active repatriation program, this number could increase if the
land is not cleared.
Minimally, the parties to the conflict-the Mujahidin, the Kabul
forces, and the Soviet military-should provide maps of land mines
laid, where such maps may exist. But there is clearly a role here
for the United Nations, with the assistance of the Soviet Union,
the United States and others, to make every effort to clear the land
of the remnants of war in order that repatriation may safely proceed.
Another possible impediment to repatriation is the Peshawarbased Afghan political parties. One senior Pakistani official remarked ruefully to the staff mission that exile Afghan party leaders have had little to do with the refugees to date, and, in fact,
some party heads have never even visited a refugee camp. But, the
official forecasted, those same party leaders would now try to keep
refugees from leaving Pakistan, thereby pressuring the international community to meet the leaders' political demands regarding Afghanistan's future government.
It is not known how much influence Afghan party officials will
have over refugees yearning to return home. Certainly, the comments of the Pakistani official have proved prescient, as certain
party leaders are now rallying refugees to hold out. These party
leaders have been an effective conduit for arms in the war in Afghanistan; hopefully, they will not use those arms to stop refugees
from going home.
Finally, there are reports that war damage to Afghanistan's infrastructure is extensive, which adds to the repatriation challenge.
Roads needed to haul food and other supplies to returnees have
been destroyed. Irrigation systems which formerly supported
Afghan agriculture have decayed or have been bombed, requiring
speedy rehabilitation.
While the restoration of Afghanistan's infrastructure is not a
sine qua non for repatriation-since Afghans will return and rebuild, or survive without it-the international community should
appreciate the difficulty it poses for successful resettlement. But in
a poor and wartorn country, the United States and others must
assist in this effort as well.

IV. BACKGROUND TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
A.

OVERVIEW

Afghanistan seized the international spotlight in December 1979
when the Soviet Union airlifted thousands of combat troops into
the Afghan capital, Kabul, to support an ailing Marxist party-a
move that represented the first direct Soviet aggression against a
non-aligned, independent country since World War II.
Apart from the loss of over 500,000 Afghan lives since then, the
most tragic consequence of this intervention has been the creation
of the world's largest refugee flow. At least 3 million Afghans now
reside in Pakistan, nearly 2 million have fled to Iran, and tens of
thousands have been displaced within their own country.
Parkistan, as a result, has had the single largest refugee population in the world, hosting within its own borders more refugees
than in east Africa, southeast Asia, and Central America combined. Between Pakistan and Iran, Afghans constitute almost half
of the estimated worldwide refugee population today. Tragically,
the population of Afghanistan has been reduced by a third since
1979, through death and forced migration.
The refugee situation in Pakistan stands out from refugee crises
elsewhere in several ways. First, Afghans have moved with relative
ease; they are not confined to camps. They live in villages and near
cities, own businesses, travel on buses and trains, and traverse, as
Afghans have done for centuries, the borders between Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iran with surprising frequency and ease.
Second, the refugees represent many ethnic groups, each of
which is distinct in religious practice (though all are Muslim), language, dress, and to some extent, history. Their experiences as Afghans have been different, and they offer sometimes contrasting
views of the country's predicament and how to confront it.
Third, the Government of Pakistan has assumed a major role in
the refugee relief effort and has shouldered much of the financial
burden. By its estimates, Pakistan contributed approximately 48
percent of the actual expenditures for refugee maintenance in
fiscal year 1987.
Fourth, Pakistanis are increasingly less accommodating of the
refugees. As in many host countries, attitudes toward refugees
often vary according to the prospects of their return and, in the
Afghan case, voluntary repatriation has never been possible until
now. Accordingly, refugees have increasingly been a source of tension. Sympathy for the Afghan cause and professions of Islamic solidarity, however, continue to generate a sense of obligation in Pakistan toward the refugees.
(19)
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B. GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM
Until 1979, Afghanistan had never been ruled by an outside
power. Between 1953 and 1979, however, the Soviet Union, which
shares more than a 1000-mile border with Afghanistan, concluded
treaties and aid packages that yielded $2.5 billion of military and
economic aid to its southern neighbor. The United States, meanwhile, devoted its attention to its relations with Iran and Pakistan.
In 1965, the Soviet Union helped form Afghanistan's first Marxist party, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA),
now the country's only legal political party. The party soon factionalized, splitting into two groups, Khalq ("the Masses") and Parcham ("the Banner"), because of personality conflicts and ideological and tactical differences. The former was led by N ur Mohamed
Taraki, a writer, and Hafizullah Amin, a teacher, both from poor
rural families; the latter was led by Babrak Karma!, a native of
Kabul.
In 1973, a former prime minister named Mohamed Daoud Khan
seized power and disbanded the 100-year-old monarchy, convincing
most observers, including the PDPA and the U.S.S.R., that he was
keen to reverse the country's political embrace of the West. In
keeping with the capricious nature of Afghan politics, however,
Daoud subsequently outlawed all political parties, cracked down on
the left and the fundamentalist right, and sought rapprochement
with Pakistan and Iran. Although Moscow remained Afghanistan's
chief economic benefactor, relations between the two countries
soured, prompting the Soviets to pressure Khalq and Parcham into
formal reconciliation.
The PDPA was not, in the mid-1970's fit to govern the country.
Apart from its divisiveness, it was an urban party with influence in
Kabul but almost nowhere else and could claim only a few thousand inexperienced members. But the repressive policies of Daoud,
and a climate of unrest throughout the country, enabled the PDPA
to carry out a coup in AP,ril 1978, to execute Daoud, and launch the
"Great Saur Revolution. '
Most analysts agree that the Soviet Union, with only 350 advisors in Afghanistan in early 1978, did not orchestrate the coup but,
rather, helped consolidate it once it took place. This consolidation
proved problematic, however. Once in power, the PDPA quickly fissioned, while sporadic, counterrevolutionary guerrilla activity
erupted in the countryside. With Taraki as President of the newly
proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and Amin as the
Deputy Prime Minister, the Khalq wing-the more radical and dogmatic of the two Marxist factions-quickly elbowed out its party
rival. Taraki "exiled" Babrak Karma!, the leader of the Parcham
wing, to the ambassadorship of Czechoslovakia, while other Parchamis were fired, arrested, or murdered.
The new government promptly launched a series of reform measures far too radical and authoritarian for rural Afghanistan. Afghanistan in 1978 was a conservative Muslim country with a literacy rate of 5%. Ordinary villagers had much closer contact with
the country's 300,000 mullahs, or local Islamic authorities, than
with the central government, and were unaccustomed to heavyhanded policies from Kabul. Although changes in the country's
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social structure might have been desirable to many Afghans, the
government's wanton attack on traditional life-from landholding
patterns to marital customs-coupled with purges in Kabul, alienated wide sectors of the Afghan population.
Initially, the United States maintained ties with the new government and continued our AID programs as well. The United States
had provided more than half a billion dollars in economic aid to
Afghanistan since World War II, supported a military training program, provided scholarships to Afghan students, and fielded a
Peace Corps contingent. All of these programs were phased out by
October 1979. In February of that year, the American ambassador,
"Spike" Dubs, had been assassinated in Kabul, prompting the
Carter administration to withdraw most American personnel while
the Soviets busily expanded their cadre of military advisors and
their influence in the day-to-day functioning of the government. All
aid to Afghanistan from non-Communist countries ceased during
the autumn of 1979.
The key figure through the autumn of 1979 was Hafizullah
Amin, who staged his own coup in September and eliminated his
former ally, Taraki. Amin was not trusted by the Soviets, however;
in fact, Moscow had reportedly wanted Taraki to remove him. Even
less sensitive to rural life than his predecessor, and having studied
in the United States, he clearly did not enjoy the confidence of the
Kremlin. His police-state tactics further damaged the credibility of
the PDPA, while his reform package only further roused the opposition, plunging the country deeper into civil war.
The Soviets turned to the exiled Babrak Karmal. On December
27, 1979, after intense street fighting in Kabul, Afghan state radio
announced the end of "the bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin"
and the leader's summary execution. Within a month, the Soviets
had 85,000 troops in Afghanistan and were vigorously attempting
to resuscitate the PDPA and the Afghan Army, beset by defections
and desertions, and quell mounting opposition throughout the
country.
C.

THE REFUGEE FLOW: NUMBERS AND PEOPLE

Although several hundred Afghan dissidents fled to Pakistan
during the Daoud regime, and following the PDPA coup of April
1978 and the Amin coup in September 1979, it was the Soviet invasion that marked the real genesis of the Afghan refugee flow.
An estimated 200,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan between the Saur
Revolution and the Amin coup (April 1978-September 1979). That
figure doubled between the Amin coup and the Soviet invasion
(September-December 1979) and by the summer of 1980 roughly
100,000 Afghans were reaching Pakistan every month.
AFGHAN EXODUS
End of:
Afghans in Pakis tan
1978.... ..... ..... ....... ... ............................................................... ...... .. ..... .................
25,000
1979.... ........ ........... ..................... .. ..... ......... ........ .......... ..... .......... .... .... .... ....... ... ..
400,000
1980.............. ..... ... ..... ..... ....... ....... ...... ......... ... .... ........ .. ..... .. ....................... ......... 1,400,000
1981... .......... .... ............... ..................................................... ..................... ....... .... 2,300,000
1988 ....... ;...................... ... ....... ..... ................ ........................... ............. ............. ... 1 3,200,000
1

Estimated.
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Refugees in the early years represented a wide cross-section of
the Afghan population. Doctors, teachers, soldiers, mullahs, the
maliks (village leaders), landlords, and shopkeepers joined farmers
and herders in the exodus to Pakistan. Wealthier refugees left by
plane whenever possible, heading to third countries or settling in
urban areas in Pakistan. The vast majority, however, were illiterate rural people, and fled on foot, taking whatever belongings and
animals they could manage.
The refugee population consists of a multitude of ethnic groups
reflecting Afghanistan's ethnic diversity: the numerically and politically dominant Pashtuns, or Pathans, who speak Pashto and inhabit a wide belt stretching from northeastern to southern Afghanistan; the Dari-speaking Tajiks (Dari is a variant of Persian and
the country's lingua franca), a Turco-Mongol ethnic group located
primarily in the northeast; the Hazaras, a Dari-speaking Mongol
race from mountainous central Afghanistan, traditionally the nation's poorest and most underprivileged ethnic group; the northern
Turkmen and Uzbeks, who speak Turkic dialects; and the Baluch,
from the southwest. Other groups include the Qizilbash, the
Kirghiz, and the Nursitanis. Regardless of ethnic affiliation, the
refugees are Muslim; and most follow the Sunni, or orthodox,
branch of Islam. The Hazaras are the largest Shia (Shiite) minority
and, therefore, have important links with Iran, a fact that bears
significantly on Iran's largely unnoticed involvement in the Afghan
war.
D.

PAKISTAN'S REFUGEE POLICY

As noted earlier, Pakistan has consistently maintained an opendoor policy toward Afghan refuges and has complied with the spirit
of the 1951 U.N. Convention and the Protocol of 1967 without
having actually signed either document. The entry, stay, and movement of all foreigners in the country is regulated by the Foreigners
Act of 1956, which has not been amended to include a temporary
asylum category. Technically, therefore, refugees are illegal immigrants. In its public pronouncements Pakistan claims that it is accommodating the Afghans according to its Islamic and humanitarian duties, and because of Pakistan's cultural, ethnic, and religious
links with Afghanistan.
At the same time, Pakistan has placed numerous restrictions on
the refugees, though some are not enforced, while others have not
realistically been enforceable. Generally, Pakistan has stressed,
both in policy and rhetoric, the impermanence of the refugee situation. For instance, refugees are not permitted to purchase immovable property and are expected to dwell where the government assigns them.
1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) sets refugee policy in Pakistan. Under its jurisdiction are the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), which oversees the logistics
of the relief operation and functions as an attached department
under SAFRON, and the Federal Committee for Relief of Afghan
Refugees, which coordinates with voluntary agencies and the
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assessing the requirements of refugees and in distributing relief
goods.
A Commissioner for Afghan Refugees oversees implementation of
refugee policy in each province and reports to the provincial Home
Department and governor. The provinces involved are Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NFWP).
About three quarters of the refugee population lives in NWFP, particularly around the capital, Peshawar.
2. THE REFUGEE VILLAGE .

The "refugee village" is the basic unit of settlement for Afghans.
Some refer to these units as Refugee Tented Villages, but so few of
the inhabitants now actually live in tents that the name is hardly
appropriate. One reason the term was used by Pakistan at the
outset was to stress the transience of the refugee population:
The refugee village is designed to be self-sufficient. There are primary and secondary schools, usually segregated by sex according to
local and Afghan custom, though there are far fewer schools for
girls than boys. Local colleges and universities sometimes reserve a
few seats for Afghans. Each village contains a basic health unit,
provided on a scale of one per 15,000 refugees, which is staffed by
nurses, midwives, dispensers, sanitary inspectors, and other medical personnel.
What immediately distinguishes a refugee camp in Pakistan
from refugee settlements in other countries is its resemblance to
sprawling village rather than a refugee camp. Most inhabitants
live in mud-brick huts within mud-walled compounds that they
themselves have built and that require reconstruction every few
years. Normally there are no enclosures around the settlement, no
physical barriers to keep people from coming and going. Inside,
there is usually a central thoroughfare lined with shops including
bicycle repair, tailoring, meat and vegetable stalls, hair-cutting,
and other small businesses. There is, finally, the mosque, usually
the tidiest and best-maintained structure in the settlement.

E. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND !Ts IMPACT
The international community began aiding Afghan refugees in
the fall of 1979. During the preceding months, refugees sustained
themselves through Pakistani and other local support, and through
their own ingenuity. Since the border that divides Afghanistan and
Pakistan also splits certain ethnic groups (the Pashtun and the
Baluch in particular), creating "cross-border tribes," many refugees
were welcomed by clan members in Pakistan, who extended hospitality in exchange for favors, labor, or support in local conflicts.
Hospitality to those in need is also an important tenet of Islam.
1. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Since 1980, the international community has borne an increasing
share of the Afghan refugee burden that costs roughly $1 million a
day. UNHCR established its offices in October 1979 and through
1986 has spent nearly $600 million on refugee programs. The
World Food Program (WFP) spends roughly $125 million annually
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on its operation, which in 1986 involved the delivery of more than
500,000 tons of food. In 1987 WFP appealed to its international
donors for 400,000 metric tons of wheat, 21,000 metric tons of
edible oil, and 14,000 metric tons of sugar. Contributions to Pakistan under bilateral programs, meanwhile, include trucks ancl
spare parts from West Germany and Japan, ambulances from
China and South Korea, kerosene from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
and medical equipment from Norway.
Working closely with Pakistan and voluntary agencies, UNHCR
coordinates international aid and supervises the implementation of
relief efforts. At the outset, UNHCR focused on the immediate
needs of recent arrivals, particularly with respect to health, shelter, and water. By late 1984, most refugee concentrations were adequately served in these areas. Accordingly, in 19~5 UNHCR shifted
its focus from basic relief and maintenance to self-reliance, concentrating in particular on income-generating schemes and vocational
training, education, and veterinary services for livestock. These sectors have accounted for 30 percent of UNHCR's budget for Pakistan, which for 1987 was targeted at $52 million-a significant decrease from 1986, but still a larger amount than any UNHCR
budget elsewhere in the world.
One of the most widely publicized and ambitious projects that
UNHCR assisted has been a joint income-generating scheme with
Pakistan and the World Bank. Started in early 1984, the scheme
consists of dozens of sub-projects aimed at improving the Pakistani
infrastructure and repairing environmental damage in heavily refugee-impacted areas. Operating on a budget of $20 million, the
project seeks to employ equal numbers of refugees and locals in efforts ranging from reforestation and road-building to flood control
and fish breeding.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) fills a vital
role in the relief effort. ICRC primarily assists war-wounded Afghans. It operates surgical hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta,
mobile medical teams in NWFP and Baluchistan, and a paraplegic
center and prosthesis workshop in Peshawar. ICRC also trains
teams of Afghan sanitarians and orderlies to assist war victims
inside Afghanistan.
2. U.S. ASSISTANCE

The United States and Pakistan are the largest contributors to
the welfare of Afghans in Pakistan. The United States channels its
aid primarily through two channels: U.N. agencies and the voluntary agencies. To UNHCR, the United States pledged $17 million in
1978 for Afghan relief, or almost a third of UNHCR's program
budget for the year, earmarking portions of its contribution for
income-generating projects, the construction of water supply systems and access roads in Baluchistan and the Punjab, and the further refinement of the health care delivery system. Since 1980, U.S.
assistance to UNHCR has averaged $20 million annually. The
United States also contributes to the reforestation portion of the
UNHCR World Bank project.
Under PL-480 Title II, WFP has received close to $350 million in
food commodities from the United States since 1979. PL-480, or the
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Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, authorized the Food for Peace Program, the major program through
which the United States provides food assistance to other nations.
Title II authorizes the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to
nations for the purpose of alleviating famine or providing disaster
relief, combatting malnutrition, and encouraging economic and community development.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to SUPJ>Orl a variety of
smaller agencies and projects. In the early 1980 s, the American
focus was primarily on the health sector, but, in keeping with Pakistan policy, has since broadened to address the larger issue of selfreliance. The agencies that have received U.S. funding since the
early 1980's are Church World Service (preventative/curative
health care programs), Catholic Relief Service (health education
and sanitation), the International Rescue Committee (health care
and education), the Salvation Army (health care and vocational rehabilitation/self-help), and Americares (the Afghan Female Surgical Hospital). In 1985, the United States started funding a Save the
Children Federation income-generating project that targets widows
and families with no alternative sources of income.
One of the recurring headaches for the donor community has
been the "numbers game" -determining the size of the refugee
population in general, and the size of refugee households in particular. A 1986 joint WFP/UNHCR mission report lamented that
"the mobility and ingenuity of the Afghan refugees has continually
frustrated the best efforts of Pakistan to determine an accurate
population figure. Similarly, the absence of a reliable population
figure has made it difficult in the past to determine the quantities
of emergency food aid required."
U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN RELIEF PROGRAM
[In millions of dollars]
FY Obligations/Organization

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

UNHCR {$) ........................................
5.0
30.0
24.2
23.0
20.1
19.7 15.17 17.427
UNHCR {R) ........................................
3.8
2.6
3.0
3.5
3.0
2.3
3.80
4.197
World Bank {R) ..................................................................................................
.8
1.0 ................ 3.000
WFP* {$) .......................................... 31.9
39.3
70.6
37.3
42.2
40.0 25.28 37.400
WFP Monitors {$) ...............................................................................................................................................
.103
WFP Monitors {R) ...............................................................................................................
.2 ..................................
ICRC {$) ............................................
.3
1.0
.7
1.0
1.4
.7
1.00
1.000
ICRC {R) .............................................................................
.3
.5
.8
.8
.78
1.200
Licross {R) .........................................
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
.8
.70
.700
Subtotal .....................................

42.0

73.9

99.8

66.3

69.3

65.5

46.73

65.027

American Volags:
AMERICARES {$) .......................................................................................................................
.12 ..................
CRS {$) .....................................................
.2 ................
.3 ................
.4
.38
.078
CRS (R) .....................................................
.6 ................................................
.I ..................................
cws ($) ....................................................
.5
.4
.4
.5
.6
.22
.173
CWS (R) ....................................................
.3 ................................................
.2
.41
.416
Ell ($) .......................................................................................................................................................
.269
IRC ($) ......................................................................
.7 ................
.3
.3
.53
.442
IRC (R) ......................................................
.3 ................................................
.2
.31
.485
MF ($) .......................................................................................................................................................
.205
SA ($) .......................................................
.2 ................
.5
.4
.5
.75
.670
SCF ($) ......................................................................................................................................
.05
.129

1980- 87
Total

154.6
26.1
4.8
324.0
.1
.2
7.1
4.3
7.2
528.6
.1
1.3
.7
2.8
1.3
.2
2.2
1.3
.2
3.0
.I
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U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN RELIEF PROGRAM-Continued
[In millions of dollars]
FY Obligations/Organization

1980

1981

WVRO ($) ...................................

1982

1984

1983

1985

1986

1980-87
Total

1987

.0

...............................................................................................

- - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -

Vo lag Subtotal.......................
Government of Pakistan.......................
Total by FY............................

2.1
1.1
8.0 .................

1.2

1.2
.3

2.3

70.8

67.8

2.77
2.867
................................

13.5
8.3

====================
42.0

84.0

100.9

67.5

49.50

68.596

551.1

Notes,
FY 1987 figures rounded to nearest $1,000.
FY 1986 figures rounded to nearest $10,000
Previous years' figures rounded to nearest $100,000.
$ U.S. Dollars
R Non-appropriated excess foreign currency (Pakistan rupee) contribution. FY 1987 exchange rate equaled 17.21 rupees per dollar.
• PL-480, Title II excess food commodities (wheat, vegetable oil, dried milk) provided through World Food Program. Includes value of
commodities and shipping.
CRS=Catholic Relief Services; CWS=Church World Service; IRC=lnternational Rescue Committee; SA=Salvation Army; SCF=Save The Children
Federation (U.S.) EIL=Experiment in International Living MF=Mercy Fund; WVRO=World Vision.

DONOR PLEDGES: WFP PROGRAM FOR AFGHANS IN PAKISTAN
[All figures in metric tons]
Wheat Donors

1980

Australia ...... .
110,000

1

1981

1982

10,000
22,875

10,000

1983

1

1984

1985

25,000

20,000

25,000

1986

1987

20,000
5,000

20,000

1988

Total

105,000
1
62,875

1

Belgium ..................... ..
1 2,000
1 2,994
22,533
116,425 1 28,850 1 57,915
EEC ............................ ..
5,000 24,696
1 12,000 115,000
1
30,000 1 65;446
France..........................
5,000
7,000
9,500
5,000
1 9,000
116,500 115,000
FRG ............................ ..
24,044
1 7,500
1 16,101
115,650 1 27,069
Italy .......................... .

11,640

Canada ....................... ..

1

33,060

1

36,026

1

50,000

1

38,000

1

40,200
10,000
1 5,000

1

34,300
10,000
1 5,000

1

44,957
12,000
1 5,000

1

65,000
14,000
1 6,000

1

25,500

1

21,635

39,053
3,000

1

1

31,101
3,000

-

-

-

-

3,000

1 6,634
22,533
1 261,176
29,696
1 306,903
72,500
1 61,500
24,044
1183,609
3,000
1 3,000

Japan ......................... ..
1

4,380

1

35,000

1

40,850

1

52,819

1

44,060

1

74,000 110,000 1 110,000

-

1

474,959

Kuwait ........................ .

11,084

11,084

Netherlands ................ ..

_:_

115,000

115,000

Norway ...................... ..
OPEC .......................... ..

16,000

16,000

PRC ........................... ..

Switzerland ................ ..

950

5,000
10,000

1 5,000
10,950

Turkey ........................ ..
1

3,828

1

3,828

UK ........................ ..

USA .................... ..

1 31,027
114,650 1 7,877 1 8,500
98,036 161,460 136,317 180,000 149,542 150,000 160,000 165,000 165,000 1,200,355

Total ................... 141,828 361,388 329,013 439,120 342,502 353,961 479,010 452,101 165,000 3,063,923
1

Indicates bilateral contribution through WFP. All other figures are for contributions to WFP Program Wang # 1380L Rev 02/24/88.
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Refugees have used a variety of techniques to inflate their family
size to acquire more than their monthly allotment of food. They
might sell or loan their passbooks, in which the receipt of rations is
stamped; deny food monitors access to their households on the
grounds that non-family members are forbidden to set eyes on the
resident women; or bribe Pakistani officials. They also double-register. Local Pakistanis sometimes pose as refugees. Particularly in
Baluchistan, refugees let the "ration malik" function as the provider, which goes against the wishes of the UNHCR that rations go
through family heads only. As a result, some refugees live well
while others struggle, and new arrivals have sometimes gone unregistered for months.
Pakistan estimates that there are also 300,000-400,000 unregistered Afghan refugees. Registration delays have been caused by
several factors: the isolation of some border crossings, the difficulty
of distinguishing genuine new arrivals from imposters seeking to
re-register, and the Pakistan policy of closing registration in certain areas to avoid upsetting the population balance between locals
and refugees. Some new arrivals have waited weeks or months for
regular rations, living on handouts and loans from relatives or
from the registered population. Even for the registered population,
food distribution has been limited and erratic.

F. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION
In spite of many problems in the relief pipeline, the vagaries of
the distribution system, occasional disharmony between relief agencies, the shortage of managers and trained personnel, the relief
effort has been remarkably successful. The condition of most refugees has shown considerable improvement since 1980; mud-walled
houses have replaced clusters of tents in barren landscapes, and
basic relief requirements have been met. Malnutrition exists but
only in pockets, and medical care, described in a 1981 congressional
report as "so minimal as to be virtually nonexistent," has today
improved remarkably.
1. HEALTH AND NUTRITION

As always, children remain the most vulnerable category in
terms of health and nutrition. A Center for Disease Control (CDC)
survey in 1986 computed an infant-mortality rate of 80 per 1000
live births in its random sample; the rate was higher in Baluchistan than in NWFP. The major causes of mortality were gastrointestinal disorders, tetanus, and measles. The CDC findings suggest
that roughly a third of child deaths are diarrhea-related, a sobering
statistic given that probably 20 percent of the entire registered population is under 5 years of age-and what conditions these children
will face during a repatriation to war-ravaged Afghanistan.
The overall nutritional status of the refugees is adequate and
may, in fact, be better than that of the local Pakistani population
in some areas. Some health personnel report that a major detriment to nutritional well-being among infants is the tendency of
mothers to prolong breast feeding without supplements until well
beyond the child's first birthday, and not to provide calorie-dense
foods during the weaning period.
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Anemia remains the main micro-nutrient deficiency, affecting
women of child-bearing age in particular. High rates of worm infestation, repeated pregnancies, and a wheat-based diet all contribute
to this problem. That refugees continue to suffer from basic ailments and easily treated diseases underlines the urgency of supplementary feeding programs, especially in the context of a future repatriation program.
2. EMPLOYMENT

Apart from receiving food rations, on which they depend for
meeting basic nutritional needs, many Afghans are able to supplement their diet with purchased commodities. To the dismay of
many Pakistanis, refugees have moved securely into the local economy in many areas and, therefore, have outside incomes. They run
small businesses in the refugee villages; work in nearby rural areas
(a move that Pakistan has, at times, encouraged to ease congestion
in certain market sectors); commute to nearby towns on buses
owned and operated by other Afghans; leave for several weeks to
mine coal or build roads; work with voluntary agencies; move to
Karachi and the Gulf states; come and go to Iran; bring carpets out
of Afghanistan and open shops in urban areas; and cook and
housewatch for expatriates. The standard wage for unskilled labor
in 1987 was 25-30 rupees a day, or about $1.50.
Women do not have the same mobility as men. Traditional
Afghan rural culture discourages women from having a substantial
role outside of the home, even from being educated. A number of
voluntary agency-sponsored income-generating projects target
women, however, providing them with handicraft material and locating markets for their products, such as carpets.
To carve out an economic niche for themselves, many Afghans
have taken up residence in urban areas. Cities and towns also draw
refugees who can afford to live outside the refugee village and,
therefore, the distribution network. The populations of Peshawar
and Quetta are roughly a quarter Afghan now; there are also sizeable refugee neighborhoods in Islamabad and Karachi. Refugees
rent houses, live in hotels, or pitch tents in vacant lots. Families
will occasionally split up, with the father moving to town to find
work while the mother remains in the refugee village with the children, or some of them.
3. OVERSEAS RESETTLEMENT

Third-country resettlement has not played an important role in
the Afghan situation. The majority of refugees clearly prefer to
return to their own country, an opportunity they will soon have.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1987 the United States had resettled
about 20,000 Afghans, many ot them well-educated urbanites. The
largest resettlement areas are in Washington, D.C., New York City,
the San Francisco Bay area, and Los Angeles. While there are few
detailed studies on the subject, it is widely believed that many Afghans are not adjusting easily to American society. Like most refugees, Afghans were proud and independent in their native land,
where they place a premium on providing hospitality and entertaining guests. Many now remain socially isolated in the United .
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States, uneasy with cultural disparities, the loss of status, the difficulty of finding jobs commensurate with positions held previously,
and the decision to place family needs ahead of the resistance
struggle. The majority of Afghans in the United States also express
a desire to return to Afghanistan someday, a desire that may detract from their ability or desire to set long-term goals in the
United States.
Other countries that have resettled Afghans include Turkey,
Australia, Canada, and West Germany.

V. IMPACT ON PAKISTAN OF REFUGEE PROBLEM
The signing of the Geneva accords, and the prospect for the first
time in over 9 years that large numbers of Afghan refugees might
be able to return to their homes, could not have come at a more
critical time for Pakistan.
Over the past few years, the presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has exacted an ever-increasing toll monetarily, environmentally, and politically. The continuing Afghan refugee presence, with no end in sight, has been viewed by many Pakistanis
with growing alarm. Indeed, most observers in the field believe
that had a settlement not been reached this year-had the Afghan
refugees been forced to remain in Pakistan for several more
years-tensions between the refugees and local Pakistanis could
have reached an explosive point and become a serious political
issue for the Pakistan government.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent influx of
refugees clearly raised a number of critical issues for Pakistan. Environmentally, Afghan refugees have denuded whole valleys of
trees while their 2-3 million livestock have trampled or gobbled
thousands of acres of vegetation, causing serious erosion problems.
Economically, the refugee's presence has cost Pakistan considerably, despite generous international support. A nation with a per
capita income of only $400, Pakistan spent $17 4 million for refugee
assistance in fiscal 1987. Refugees, meanwhile, have generated resentment because of their penetration into local economies and infringement on scarce resources.
In terms of security, the presence of the Afghan refugee resistance has drawn Soviet and Afghan aircraft to bomb and strafe targets inside Pakistan, killing and wounding both refugees and local
citizens. Foreign agents, blending in with the refugee population,
have planted with growing regularity bombs at hospitals and
schools, or in bazaars and vegetable carts. Over the past several
months, a week has not gone by without further loss of life. Finally, due to the amount of arms flowing in and out of Pakistan, a
climate akin to the old American West prevails along the Afghan
border. The intermittent rioting in Karachi is partly the result of
Afghan (Pashtun, specifically) involvement in arms and drug trafficking. In the eyes of many Pakistanis, the refugees are the root
cause of many of these troubling developments.
Although the Afghan refugee crisis triggered a massive aid program for Pakistan, and perhaps elevated that country's status in
the Muslim world, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan had clearly
placed Pakistan in a vulnerable position. As a result, Pakistan has
led the opposition to the Soviet presence from the outset. A central
component to that opposition has been its unofficial acquiescence
as a conduit for aid to the resistance.
(30)

VI. FORCES LEADING TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
The settlement that has been reached in Geneva is clearly the
result of forces at work in the field for some years-the growing
military pressure of the Afghan resistance (the Mujahidin), the inability of Soviet troops to eliminate or really control those forces,
and the weakness and vulnerability ofrthe regimes in Kabul. From
the interplay of those forces over the past several years, but particularly last year, decisions were reached in Islamabad, Washington, and especially in Moscow, that have led to the prospect of a
settlement and the repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees.
An unobstructed assistance pipeline through Pakistan has been
crucial to efforts to aid the Mujahidin, and the CIA has directed
the largest American covert operation since the Vietnam war
across the border into Afghanistan. While some Middle Eastern
and Asian countries-Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China-also
assisted the rebels, the U.S. aid package alone, consisting of weapons, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, and money for food,
reached an estimated $630 million in fiscal year 1987. This package
comes on top of a $3.2 billion, 6-year economic and 5-year military
assistance program to Pakistan that began in 1981 and that Congress renewed, with stipulations, in the fall of 1987.
Publicly, the United States has been an unwavering supporter of
the Mujahidin since 1979, as has the United Nations, whose resolutions condemning foreign intervention in Afghanistan have passed
by large margins every year.
A. U.S.

ASSISTANCE

Since late 1984, when Congress approved a resolution (Senate
Congressional Resolution 74) calling on the United States to "support effectively the people of Afghanistan in their fight for freedom," the United States has escalated the aid program across the
border. In April 1985, President Reagan issued a National Security
Decision Directive calling on the United States to drive Soviet
forces from Afghanistan "by all means available." The Senate followed its earlier pronouncements with a resolution in January
1987 to "renew its commitment . . . to support the people of Afghanistan through the provision of appropriate material support."
The upshot was an increase in both the quantity and sophistication
of weapons supplied to the guerrillas, and the appearance inside
Afghanistan of U.S.-directed humanitarian assistance programs.
In terms of weapons, the most significant development was the
provision of ''Stinger" missiles to the Mujahidin. The Stinger is a
portable, 34 pound, heat-seeking, shoulder fired antiaircraft missile
which the guerrillas have used with increasing effectiveness since
shipments and training began in late 1986. The Stinger was the
latest addition to an arsenal that already included rocket-propelled
(31)
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grenade~,/ Sam-7 heat-seeking missiles, tanks, semiautomatic rifles,
and whatever else the insurgents have captured on their own.
While better training and weaponry increased the fighting power
of the Mujahidin, it is widely believed among officials involved
with the pipeline that anywhere from 20-70 percent of U.S. military aid for the insurgents never reached its real destination;
rather, for reasons ranging from expediency to personal profit, it
has been appropriated, traded, sold, or hidden by groups with
access to the shipments-to the Pakistan armed forces, Afghan political parties based in Peshawar, rebel commanders or individual
guerrillas.
Meanwhile, in 1985, the United States developed an AID administered cross-border humanitarian assistance program for Afghanistan. Its short-term component has consisted of grants in foreign
assistance that are typically made to American and European voluntary agencies in Pakistan, which then transfer the funds to nonAmerican groups operating inside Afghanistan. In 1987, some $30
million in U.S. grants supported medical clinics inside Afghanistan,
medical training for Afghans, food provisions for deficit areas
inside Afghanistan; and a variety of activities aimed at strengthening education, transportation, and commodity support in rebel-held
areas.
A longer term component is a larger, more ambitious, and more
controversial part of the cross-border program. Its emphasis has
been sectoral. In the health sector, the goal has been to develop extensive curative health services for war-related injuries and preventive services for basic public health, including maternal and
child care. In education, the aim has been to support and improve
existing lower schools in resistance-controlled areas, which would
include training teachers, providing school supplies, and funding
school construction. In agriculture, the focus has been on the attainment of self-sufficiency through the provision of agricultural
extension and technical assistance. And in commodity support, the
task has been to make available food, agricultural inputs, and a
range of humanitarian goods to encourage the continuation of food
production in rural Afghanistan.
The objectives of the cross border program were, and continue to
be, humanitarian. The underlying rationale is that a continued refugee flow debilitates the resistance and overtaxes Pakistan economically and politically. The immediate objective was to improve
the ability of Afghans to sustain themselves inside Afghanistan.
Strategists hope that, as a result, emigration from rural areas to
Soviet-Afghan government controlled urban areas . would decline,
and that Afghans in Pakistan will voluntarily return to resistancecontrolled areas.
AID administers the cross-border program through its Representative for Afghan Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, an
office that was established in September 1985 and is staffed by
career.AID personnel. Probably the most important function of this
office has been to work closely with the seven-party Mujahidin alliance, the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Muyahidin, in identifying
target areas. These seven resistance groups, which have formed
health, education, and logistics committees to oversee the imple-
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mentation of the program, channel whatever goods and equipment
AID provides to field commanders inside Afghanistan.
The Afghan Affairs office also oversees an Economic Support
Fund program, a PL-480 Title II emergency relief food grant
(wheat and soybean oil) for war-affected Afghans, and the implementation of the Department of Defense-funded "McCollum
Amendment" program. The Economic Support Fund makes available funds for the provision of food, medicine, or other humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people. The McCollum Amendment
(Section 308 of PL-235) calls for the Secretary of Defense to "provide nonlethal assistance . . . to persons displaced or who are refugees because of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union."
Nonlethal assistance comes primarily from Department of Defense
surpluses and from private American groups; the Denton Amendment (1984) authorizes the Pentagon to transport humanitarian aid
provided by private groups, on military aircraft at no cost, when
space is available. McCollum funds have also financed the transportation of Afghans to the United States for medical treatment; as
of June 1987, 325 patients had been moved under the program.
Congress earmarked $15 million in ESF funds for war-affected Afghans in fiscal year 1986, and added $30 million to the program in
fiscal year 1987. The PL-480 program cost $15 million in 1986,
while 1986 funds for the McCollum program amounted to $10 million.

B. UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION
Although the crucial point in breaking the deadlock and prolonged conflict in Afghanistan was the decision by the Soviet
Union, as announced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, to
withdraw, unilaterally if necessary, all Soviet forces from the country-that decision might not have occurred without the negotiations launched in 1982 by the United Nations Secretary General.
No international agreement could have been reached without the
neutrality, the persistence and patience of the United Nations negotiator, Mr. Diego Cordovez.
The Geneva talks had taken place intermittently since June
1982. Representatives from Pakistan and Afghanistan did not meet
face-to-face, however; negotiations were conducted by Mr. Cordovez
between Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran. (Iran, although home to an
estimated two million Afghan refugees, had refused to participate
directly because the Afghan Mujahidin were not officially represented in the negotiations.)
As signed in Geneva, and as described earlier, the accords consist
of four instruments: non-interference, international guarantees
concerning non-interference, the repatriation of refugees, and
"interrelationships," or the relationship between a Soviet withdrawal and an end to Pakistan's support for the resistance; [See
Appendix for text].
Those accords are truly the force that will hopefully lead to
peace and stability in Afghanistan-and to the opportunity for millions of its refugees to return to their homes and lands.

APPENDIX
FINAL TEXT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS
April 13, 5 p.m., 1988
BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
MUTUAL RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND
NON-INTERVENTION

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,
Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace
and security in the region,
Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of
States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine
their own political, economic cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention,
interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsover,
Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as
well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference
in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and
non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States.
ARTICLE II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes
to comply with the following obligations:
(1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial
integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other
(35)
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High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;
(2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other
High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in
any form whatsoever;
(3) To refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt
the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other
High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;
(4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which
would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and
social stability of the other High Contracting Party;
(5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or
covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of
military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs
of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;
(6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or
under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability
of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;
(7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support,
direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the
other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or
from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting
Party;
· (8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the
purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting
Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the
other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such
mercenaries;
(9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with
other States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and
external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
(10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the
internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
(11) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist
groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;
(12) to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in
camps and bases or otherwise, organizing training, financing,
equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and other
groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in
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the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly
also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of
arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;
(13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be
considered as interference or intervention.
ARTICLE III

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.
ARTICLE IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this
Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into force.
ARTICLE V

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu
languages, all texts being equally authentic. In the case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of
April 1988.
For the Government of the
Republic of Afghanistan:

For the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
of the United States of America,
Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political
settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen internationalf peace and security in the region;
Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect
for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment;
Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference
and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the
Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference
and Non-Intervention;
Urge all States to act likewise.
The present Declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.
Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988 in five original
copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being
equally authentic.
For the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

For the Government of the
United States of America:
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BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE VOLUNTARY
RETURN OF REFUGEES

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,
Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace
and security in the region,
Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees
are satisfactory to them,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to
return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement.
ARTICLE II

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all
necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland:
(a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their
homeland;
(b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;
(c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living
conditions and to share in the welfare of the State;
(d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal
basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall
be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on
the basis of the Land and Water Reform;
(e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan
without discrimination.
The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to
implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities,
all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.
ARTICLE III

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan
refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide,
within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.
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ARTICLE IV

For the purpose of organising, coordinating and supervising the
operations which should affect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful
repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice.
For the performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and
have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High
Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities
for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who
express the wish to return.
ARTICLE VI

At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide
assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in
accordance with the present Agreement. Special agreements may
be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE VII

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At
that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be
established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees
under this Agreement shall commence.
The arrangements · set out in Articles IV and V above shall
remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period
the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that
may be called for.
ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu, and Urdu
languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of
April 1988.
For the Government of the
Republic of Afghanistan:

For the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

AGREEMENT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations with the support of all Governments concerned
and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settle-
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ment of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully
brought to an end.
2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement
designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a
framework for good-neighbourliness and co-operation, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the
intermediary of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations
held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983.
The Personal Representative again visited the area for high level
discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change
the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity
talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative
were held at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to
the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985
preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20
to 25 June, from 27 to 30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985.
The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area
from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was
suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8
August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from 20
November to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the
talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March
1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representative again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and
the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The
format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988, when the
instruments comprising the settlement were finalized, and, accordingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the
negotiations throughout the diplomatic process.
3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the
United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be
based on the following principles of international law:
The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
The principle that States shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security and justice are not endangered;
The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations;
The duty to States to co-operate with one another in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations;
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
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The principle of sovereign equality of States;
The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
The two Governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan
refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.
4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement:
A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention;
A Declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;
A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;
The present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan.
5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention; the
Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement
on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and the present Agreement
on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a
phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the
date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops
will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all
troops will be completed within nine months.
6. The interrelations:t?-ips in paragraph 5 above have been agreed
upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties;
the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary
return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the timeframe specified in the agreement on the voluntary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign trops will start and be completed within the timeframe envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts
of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required
to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments
be completed in good faith.
7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.
A representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will
assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them.
He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval
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suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.
In order to enable him to fulfill his tasks, the representative
shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required.
On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the
personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the
provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For
that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all
the necessary co-operation from the Parties, including all freedom
of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to
the two Governments shall be considered in a meeting of the Parties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted.
The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the
representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed
upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement.
8. The present instrument will be registered with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the
States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions. The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized
thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was
present.
Done, at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the English, Pashtu, Russian and Urdu languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.
For the Government of the
For the Government of the
Republic of Afghanistan:
Islamic Republic of Pakistan:
In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-Guarantors
affixed their signatures hereunder:
For the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

For the Government of the
United States of America:

ANNEX
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
I. BASIC REQUIREMENTS

(a) The Parties will provide full support and co-operation to the
Representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel
assigned to assist him;
(b) The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective
assistance, including freedom of movement and communications,
accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be
necessary for the performance of their tasks. Afghanistan and
Pakistan undertake to grant to the Representative and his staff all
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the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. .
(c) Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of
the Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel
while operating in their respective countries.
(d) In performing their functions, the Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality.
The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel
must not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan and, in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for
any of the Parties concerned.
II. MANDATE

The mandate for the implementation-assistance as derived from
arrangements envisaged in paragraph 7 derives from the instruments comprising the settlement. All the staff assigned to the Representative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be carefully
briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the
procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof.
III. MODUS OPERANDI AND PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION

The Secretary-General will appoint a senior military Officer as
Deputy to the Representative, who will be stationed in the area, as
head of two small headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other
in Islamabad, each comprising five military Officers, drawn from
existing UN operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff.
The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will
act on behalf of the Representative and be in contact with the Parties through the Liaison Officer each Party will designate for this
purpose.
The two headquarters units will be organized into two Inspection
Teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments
comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the
Representative of the Secretary-General or his Deputy, up to 40 additional military Officers (some 10 additional Inspection Teams)
will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest possible time (normally around 48 hours).
The nationalities of all the Officers will be determined in consultation with the Parties.
Whenever necessary the Representative of the Secretary-General, who will periodically visit the area for consultatjons with the
Parties and to review the work of his personnel, will also assign to
the area members of his own office and other civilian personnel
from the UN Secretariat as may be needed. His Deputy will alternate between the two headquarters units and · will remain at all
times in close communication with him.
IV. PROCEDURE

(a) Inspections conducted at the request of the Parties:
(i) A complaint regarding a violation of the instruments of the

settlement lodged by any of the Parties should be submitted in
writing, in the English language, to the respective headquarters
units and should indicate all relevant information and details.
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(ii) Upon receipt of a complaint the Deputy to the Representative
of the Secretary-General will immediately inform the other Party
of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making on-site
inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure
which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged
violation. Such inspection will be conducted using headquarters
staff as referred to above, unless the Deputy Representative of the
Secretary-General considers that additional teams are needed. In
that case, the Parties will, under the principle of freedom of movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their
respective territories.
(iii) Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and
submitted by the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General
to the two Governments, on a confidential basis. (A third copy of
the Report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential
basis, to United Nations Headquarters in New York, exclusively for
the information of the Secretary-General and his Representative.)
In accordance with paragraph 7 a report on an investigation should
be considered in a meeting of the Parties not later than 48 hours
after it has been submitted. The Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will, in the absence of the Representative, lend his
good office(s) to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the
organization of the meetings and participate in them. In the context of those meetings, the Deputy Representative of the SecretaryGeneral may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful
and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.
(Such suggestions and recommendations will be, as a matter of
course, consulted with, and cleared by the Representative of the
Secretary-General.)
(b) Inspections conducted on the initiative of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:
In addition to inspections requested by the Parties, the Deputy
Representative of the Secretary-General may carry out on his own
initiative and in consultation with the Representative inspections
he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of
paragraph 7. If it is considered that the conclusions reached in an
inspection justify a report to the Parties, the same procedure used
in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at
the request of the Parties will be followed.
Level of participation in meetings.-As indicated above, the
Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will participate at
meetings of the Parties convened for the purpose of considering reports on violations. Should the Parties decide to meet for the purpose outlined in paragraph 7 at a high political level, the Representative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such
meetings.
V . DURATION

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General and
the other personnel will be established in the area not later than
twenty days before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease to exist two months after the completion of
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all timeframes envisaged for the implementation of the instruments.
VI. FINANCING

The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the Parties will be borne by the respective Governments. The salaries and
travel expenses of the international personnel to and from the
area, as well as the costs of the local personnel assigned to the
headquarters units, will be defrayed by the United Nations.
U.S. STATEMENT
The United States has agreed to act as a guarantor of the political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, in ending
the bloodshed in that unfortuante country, and in enabling millions of Afghan refugees to return to their homes.
In agreeing to act as guarantor, the United States states the following:
(1) The troop withdrawal obligations set out in paragraphs 5 and
6 of the Instrument on Interrelationships are central to the entire
settlement. Compliance with those obligations is essential to
achievement of the settlement's purposes, namely, the ending of
foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the restoration of the
rights of the Afghan people through the exercise of self determination as called for by the United Nations Charter and the United
Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan.
(2) The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union
that the United States retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing
military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the United States
similarly will exercise restraint.
(3) By acting as a guarantor of the settlement, the United States
does not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present
regime in Kabul as the lawful government of Afghanistan.
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